A metric space is said to be locally non-compact if every neighborhood contains a sequence that is eventually bounded away from every element of the space, hence contains no accumulation point. We show within recursive mathematics that a nonvoid complete metric space is locally non-compact iff it is without isolated points.The result has an interesting consequence in computable analysis: If a complete metric space has a computable witness that it is without isolated points, then every neighborhood contains a computable sequence (...) that is eventually computably bounded away from every computable element of the space. (shrink)

Specker sequences are constructive, increasing, bounded sequences of rationals that do not converge to any constructive real. A sequence is said to be a strong Specker sequence if it is Specker and eventually bounded away from every constructive real. Within Bishop's constructive mathematics we investigate non-decreasing, bounded sequences of rationals that eventually avoid sets that are unions of sequences of intervals with rational endpoints. This yields surprisingly straightforward proofs of certain basic results fromconstructive mathematics. Within Russian constructivism, we show how (...) to use this general method to generate Specker sequences. Furthermore, we show that any nonvoid subset of the constructive reals that has no isolated points contains a strictly increasing sequence that is eventually bounded away from every constructive real. If every neighborhood of every point in the subset contains a rational number different from that point, the subset contains a strong Specker sequence. (shrink)

The spectrum of a first-order sentence is the set of natural numbers occurring as the cardinalities of finite models of the sentence. In a recent survey, Durand et al. introduce a new class of real numbers, the spectral reals, induced by spectra and pose two open problems associated to this class. In the present note, we answer these open problems as well as other open problems from an earlier, unpublished version of the survey. Specifically, we prove that every algebraic real (...) is spectral, every automatic real is spectral, the subword density of a spectral real is either 0 or 1, and both may occur, and every right-computable real number between 0 and 1 occurs as the subword entropy of a spectral real. In addition, Durand et al. note that the set of spectral reals is not closed under addition or multiplication. We extend this result by showing that the class of spectral reals is not closed under any computable operation satisfying some mild conditions. (shrink)

BackgroundHealthcare professionals are exposed to advertisements for prescription drugs in medical journals. Such advertisements may increase prescriptions of new drugs at the expense of older treatments even when they have no added benefits, are more harmful, and are more expensive. The publication of medical advertisements therefore raises ethical questions related to editorial integrity.MethodsWe conducted a descriptive cross-sectional study of all medical advertisements published in the Journal of the Danish Medical Association in 2015. Drugs advertised 6 times or more were compared (...) with older comparators: comparative evidence of added benefit; Defined Daily Dose cost; regulatory safety announcements; and completed and ongoing post-marketing studies 3 years after advertising.ResultsWe found 158 medical advertisements for 35 prescription drugs published in 24 issues during 2015, with a median of 7 advertisements per issue. Four drug groups and 5 single drugs were advertised 6 times or more, for a total of 10 indications, and we made 14 comparisons with older treatments. We found: ‘no added benefit’ in 4 of 14 comparisons, ‘uncertain benefits’ in 7, and ‘no evidence’ in 3 comparisons. In no comparison did we find evidence of ‘substantial added benefit’ for the new drug; advertised drugs were 2 to 196 times more expensive per Defined Daily Dose; 11 safety announcements for five advertised drugs were issued compared to one announcement for one comparator drug; 20 post-marketing studies were requested for the advertised drugs versus 10 studies for the comparator drugs, and 7 studies assessed both an advertised and a comparator drug at 3 year follow-up.Conclusions and relevanceIn this cross-sectional study of medical advertisements published in the Journal of the Danish Medical Association during 2015, the most advertised drugs did not have documented substantial added benefits over older treatments, whereas they were substantially more expensive. From January 2021, the Journal of the Danish Medical Association no longer publishes medical advertisements. (shrink)

It has been widely discussed whether the existence of other universes than the known universe is a purely metaphysical consideration. This paper argues to the contrary that the existence of other universes is a meaningful hypothesis, which can be tested based on observable data. The paper applies the perspective of observer bias as an approach for assigning probabilities to the mutually excluding hypotheses of universe vs. multiverse, i.e., whether the known universe is the only universe, or just one universe in (...) an ensemble of universes, a so-called multiverse. The basic idea of the paper relies on the following consideration. In a multiverse, the vast majority of observers would live in universes that are more life friendly. Thus, conditional on there being a multiverse, we should expect to find ourselves in a universe with values of the fundamental parameters that provide particularly fertile grounds for life. In contrast, if there is only a single universe, it may well be the case that there is still a few observers even if the parameters are far from ideal for life, and in that case, those observers will find values of the parameters that are not ideal for intelligent life. It may well be the case that, among all parameter configurations that allow life at least somewhere, those that are not ideal for life far outnumber those that are ideal for life. Based on this elementary consideration, the paper proceeds to propose a quantitative framework to determine probabilities for either hypothesis. In particular, it is described how a future ab initio determination of some of the factors in the Drake equation may be used to infer which one of the two hypotheses is the more likely. A quantitative approach to this end is proposed. Expressing these factors of the Drake equation in the context of the two hypotheses, a general likelihood approach is first described. Then, to support intuition, example computations are provided, illustrating how an actual hypothesis test would work in practice. (shrink)

Lower levels of news use are generally understood to be associated with less political engagement among citizens. But while some people simply have a low preference for news, others avoid the news intentionally. So far little is known about the relationship between active news avoidance and civic engagement in society, a void this study has set out to fill. Based on a four-wave general population panel survey in the Netherlands, conducted between April and July 2020 (N = 1,084) during a (...) crisis situation, this research-in-brief investigates the development of news avoidance and pro-social civic engagement over time. Results suggest that higher news topic avoidance results in higher levels of civic engagement. The study discusses different explanations for why less news can mean more engagement. (shrink)

Researchers from diverse disciplines, including organismal and cellular physiology, sports science, human nutrition, evolution and ecology, have sought to understand the causes and consequences of the surprising variation in metabolic rate found among and within individual animals of the same species. Research in this area has been hampered by differences in approach, terminology and methodology, and the context in which measurements are made. Recent advances provide important opportunities to identify and address the key questions in the field. By bringing together (...) researchers from different areas of biology and biomedicine, we describe and evaluate these developments and the insights they could yield, highlighting the need for more standardisation across disciplines. We conclude with a list of important questions that can now be addressed by developing a common conceptual and methodological toolkit for studies on metabolic variation in animals. (shrink)

Philosophers have applied the framework of constitutive grounds to make sense of the disagreement between subjectivism and objectivism. The framework understands the two theories as being involved in a disagreement about the extent to which value is determined by attitudes. Although the framework affords us with some useful observations about how this should be interpreted, the question how value can be determined by attitudes in the first place is left largely unanswered. Here we explore the benefits of a positive interpretation (...) which aims to address this oversight and make the framework more informative. This interpretation, which is inspired by the recent work of Schroeder and Sobel, claims that the relevant sense in which value can be determined by attitudes is discovered by seeing how facts can be endowed with the normative property of being a reason. We argue that this interpretation significantly deepens our understanding of the disagreement between subjectivism and objectivism. (shrink)

Background conditions are thought to explain how objects can have value in virtue of certain features and how reasons can consist in certain facts. The following paper provides an account of what background conditions are and what effect they have on normative features. It defends the idea that if values depend on reasons, then there is nothing really surprising or mysterious about the presence of background conditions in normative explanations. Background conditions turn out to be a natural and predictable result (...) of normative hierarchies that treat reasons as metaphysically fundamental relative to other normative features. The account is also shown to have advantages over competing accounts in that it is able to capture the functional criteria that characterize background conditions while remaining theoretically parsimonious. (shrink)

Exceptionally preserved fossils are the product of complex interplays of biological and geological processes including burial, autolysis and microbial decay, authigenic mineralization, diagenesis, metamorphism, and finally weathering and exhumation. Determining which tissues are preserved and how biases affect their preservation pathways is important for interpreting fossils in phylogenetic, ecological, and evolutionary frameworks. Although laboratory decay experiments reveal important aspects of fossilization, applying the results directly to the interpretation of exceptionally preserved fossils may overlook the impact of other key processes that (...) remove or preserve morphological information. Investigations of fossils preserving non-biomineralized tissues suggest that certain structures that are decay resistant are rarely preserved, and decay-prone structures can fossilize, albeit rarely. As we review here, decay resistance is an imperfect indicator of fossilization potential, and a suite of biological and geological processes account for the features preserved in exceptional fossils. Organisms decayed experimentally in seawater have been used as direct analogs for soft-bodied fossil taxa, with fossils representing a snapshot of a particular stage of decay. We argue that numerous geological and biological processes account for fossilization and that all of these should be considered when reconstructing extinct organisms. (shrink)

Exceptionally preserved fossils are the product of complex interplays of biological and geological processes including burial, autolysis and microbial decay, authigenic mineralization, diagenesis, metamorphism, and finally weathering and exhumation. Determining which tissues are preserved and how biases affect their preservation pathways is important for interpreting fossils in phylogenetic, ecological, and evolutionary frameworks. Although laboratory decay experiments reveal important aspects of fossilization, applying the results directly to the interpretation of exceptionally preserved fossils may overlook the impact of other key processes that (...) remove or preserve morphological information. Investigations of fossils preserving non-biomineralized tissues suggest that certain structures that are decay resistant are rarely preserved, and decay-prone structures can fossilize, albeit rarely. As we review here, decay resistance is an imperfect indicator of fossilization potential, and a suite of biological and geological processes account for the features preserved in exceptional fossils. Organisms decayed experimentally in seawater have been used as direct analogs for soft-bodied fossil taxa, with fossils representing a snapshot of a particular stage of decay. We argue that numerous geological and biological processes account for fossilization and that all of these should be considered when reconstructing extinct organisms. (shrink)

For f, g $ \in \omega ^\omega $ let $c_{f,g}^\forall $ be the minimal number of uniform g-splitting trees (or: Slaloms) to cover the uniform f-splitting tree, i.e., for every branch v of the f-tree, one of the g-trees contains v. $c_{f,g}^\exists $ is the dual notion: For every branch v, one of the g-trees guesses v(m) infinitely often. It is consistent that $c_{f \in ,g \in }^\exists = c_{f \in ,g \in }^\forall = k_ \in $ for N₁ many (...) pairwise different cardinals $k_ \in $ and suitable pairs $(f_{ \in ,g \in } ).$ For the proof we use creatures with sufficient bigness and halving. We show that the lim-inf creature forcing satisfies fusion and pure decision. We introduce decisiveness and use it to construct a variant of the countable support iteration of such forcings, which still satisfies fusion and pure decision. (shrink)

It appears that consciousness science is progressing soundly, in particular in its search for the neural correlates of consciousness. There are two main approaches to this search, one is content-based (focusing on the contrast between conscious perception of, e.g., faces vs. houses), the other is state-based (focusing on overall conscious states, e.g., the contrast between dreamless sleep vs. the awake state). Methodological and conceptual considerations of a number of concrete studies show that both approaches are problematic: the content-based approach seems (...) to set aside crucial aspects of consciousness; and the state-based approach seems over-inclusive in a way that is hard to rectify without losing sight of the crucial conscious-unconscious contrast. Consequently, the search for the neural correlates of consciousness is in need of new experimental paradigms. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11.1 (2004) 65-70 [Access article in PDF] Top-Down and Bottom-Up in Delusion Formation Jakob Hohwy Keywords delusions, top-down, bottom-up, predictive coding Some delusions may arise as responses to unusual experiences (Davies et al. 2001; Maher 1974;). The implication is that delusion formation in some cases involves some kind of bottom-up mechanism—roughly, from perception to belief. Delusion formation may also involve some kind of top-down (...) mechanism. This could be in the shape of a patient's flawed background beliefs, or biases, which somehow modulate perception or ensure delusional interpretations of experience. There is little agreement about what kind of mechanism is primary in delusion formation, or, indeed, what the particular mechanisms and their neural substrates might be.In the evaluation of top-down and bottom-up mechanisms in delusion formation, a number of conceptual questions should be addressed (Davies and Coltheart 2000). For example, if there is an experiential component, why is a hypothesis with a delusional explanation of the unusual experience seen as relevant? Why do the subjects come to believe it tenaciously? How come some unusual experiences do not develop into delusions?A number of empirical findings also need to be taken into account: for example, the damage to the autonomic system in Capgras delusion (Ellis et al. 1997), the decreased ability for fast error correction in schizophrenia (Frith and Done 1989), modulation of activity in parietal cortex in delusions of alien control and other passivity experiences (Blakemore, Oakley, and Frith 2003), and also in schizophrenia, the increased sensitivity to self-produced stimuli, such as tickling oneself (Blakemore et al. 2000) and the sound of one's own voice (Ford et al. 2001).Theory choice can also be guided by philosophical doctrines about, for example, the nature of belief, the constitutive role of rationality, and intersubjectivity and the nature of judgements about the external world. It is natural, however, to let beliefs about philosophical doctrine be secondary to empirical findings and conceptual issues.The distinction between bottom-up and top-down mechanisms is particularly sharp in John Campbell's (2001) account of delusions and in Tim Bayne and Elisabeth Pacherie's (2004) discussion of Campbell. In this discussion, top-down approaches are associated with the general philosophical doctrine of rationalism, and bottom-up approaches with the philosophical doctrine of empiricism. Campbell's account is top-down because he posits delusional framework beliefs that arise directly as a result of brain damage or malfunction, and that work in some top-down fashion on the interpretation of experience. Bayne [End Page 65] and Pacherie convincingly defend empiricism against Campbell's rationalist account. Among their many other objections, they briefly puzzle about how a delusional framework belief (e.g., that one's spouse is an impostor) in a top-down fashion could cause the damage to the autonomic system seen in the Capgras and Cotard delusions (2004, 1). I think this is a very important objection because skin conductance data are part of the evidence for the bottom-up hypothesis concerning the Capgras delusion. We could add to this, for example, that it is mysterious how belief in a top-down fashion could cause people with schizophrenia to be worse at fast error correction than normal controls, to be better at tickling themselves than normal controls, and to have an increased response to the sound of their own voice.On the other hand, although the skin conductance response (SCR) evidence suggests a bottom-up approach to the Capgras delusion, it does not explain the character of the subjective experience that is hypothesized to give rise to the delusional belief: reduced SCR is not part of the experience itself (thanks to Ian Gold for discussion of this). Something more is required to give a full account of the type of experience that gives rise to the delusion. Further, as they stand, most bottom-up accounts are unable to account for why reality testing fails for beliefs based on these experiences.Neither rationalism nor empiricism on their own seem able to address the conceptual questions while paying... (shrink)

For \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${f,g\in\omega^\omega}$$\end{document} let \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${c^\forall_{f,g}}$$\end{document} be the minimal number of uniform g-splitting trees needed to cover the uniform f-splitting tree, i.e., for every branch ν of the f-tree, one of the g-trees contains ν. Let \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${c^\exists_{f,g}}$$\end{document} be the dual notion: For every branch ν, one of the g-trees guesses ν(m) infinitely often. We show that (...) it is consistent that \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${c^\exists_{f_\epsilon,g_\epsilon}{=}c^\forall_{f_\epsilon,g_\epsilon}{=}\kappa_\e psilon}$$\end{document} for continuum many pairwise different cardinals \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa_\epsilon}$$\end{document} and suitable pairs \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${(f_\epsilon,g_\epsilon)}$$\end{document}. For the proof we introduce a new mixed-limit creature forcing construction. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11.1 (2004) 65-70 [Access article in PDF] Top-Down and Bottom-Up in Delusion Formation Jakob Hohwy Keywords delusions, top-down, bottom-up, predictive coding Some delusions may arise as responses to unusual experiences (Davies et al. 2001; Maher 1974;). The implication is that delusion formation in some cases involves some kind of bottom-up mechanism—roughly, from perception to belief. Delusion formation may also involve some kind of top-down (...) mechanism. This could be in the shape of a patient's flawed background beliefs, or biases, which somehow modulate perception or ensure delusional interpretations of experience. There is little agreement about what kind of mechanism is primary in delusion formation, or, indeed, what the particular mechanisms and their neural substrates might be.In the evaluation of top-down and bottom-up mechanisms in delusion formation, a number of conceptual questions should be addressed (Davies and Coltheart 2000). For example, if there is an experiential component, why is a hypothesis with a delusional explanation of the unusual experience seen as relevant? Why do the subjects come to believe it tenaciously? How come some unusual experiences do not develop into delusions?A number of empirical findings also need to be taken into account: for example, the damage to the autonomic system in Capgras delusion (Ellis et al. 1997), the decreased ability for fast error correction in schizophrenia (Frith and Done 1989), modulation of activity in parietal cortex in delusions of alien control and other passivity experiences (Blakemore, Oakley, and Frith 2003), and also in schizophrenia, the increased sensitivity to self-produced stimuli, such as tickling oneself (Blakemore et al. 2000) and the sound of one's own voice (Ford et al. 2001).Theory choice can also be guided by philosophical doctrines about, for example, the nature of belief, the constitutive role of rationality, and intersubjectivity and the nature of judgements about the external world. It is natural, however, to let beliefs about philosophical doctrine be secondary to empirical findings and conceptual issues.The distinction between bottom-up and top-down mechanisms is particularly sharp in John Campbell's (2001) account of delusions and in Tim Bayne and Elisabeth Pacherie's (2004) discussion of Campbell. In this discussion, top-down approaches are associated with the general philosophical doctrine of rationalism, and bottom-up approaches with the philosophical doctrine of empiricism. Campbell's account is top-down because he posits delusional framework beliefs that arise directly as a result of brain damage or malfunction, and that work in some top-down fashion on the interpretation of experience. Bayne [End Page 65] and Pacherie convincingly defend empiricism against Campbell's rationalist account. Among their many other objections, they briefly puzzle about how a delusional framework belief (e.g., that one's spouse is an impostor) in a top-down fashion could cause the damage to the autonomic system seen in the Capgras and Cotard delusions (2004, 1). I think this is a very important objection because skin conductance data are part of the evidence for the bottom-up hypothesis concerning the Capgras delusion. We could add to this, for example, that it is mysterious how belief in a top-down fashion could cause people with schizophrenia to be worse at fast error correction than normal controls, to be better at tickling themselves than normal controls, and to have an increased response to the sound of their own voice.On the other hand, although the skin conductance response (SCR) evidence suggests a bottom-up approach to the Capgras delusion, it does not explain the character of the subjective experience that is hypothesized to give rise to the delusional belief: reduced SCR is not part of the experience itself (thanks to Ian Gold for discussion of this). Something more is required to give a full account of the type of experience that gives rise to the delusion. Further, as they stand, most bottom-up accounts are unable to account for why reality testing fails for beliefs based on these experiences.Neither rationalism nor empiricism on their own seem able to address the conceptual questions while paying... (shrink)

We introduce the notion of effective Axiom A and use it to show that some popular tree forcings are Suslin+. We introduce transitive nep and present a simplified version of Shelah’s “preserving a little implies preserving much”: If I is a Suslin ccc ideal (e.g. Lebesgue-null or meager) and P is a transitive nep forcing (e.g. P is Suslin+) and P does not make any I-positive Borel set small, then P does not make any I-positive set small.

The normative character of meaning creates deep problems for the attempt to give a reductive explanation of the constitution of meaning. I identify and critically examine an increasingly popular Carnap-style position, which I call Internalized Meaning Factualism (versions of which I argue are defended by, e.g., Robert Brandom, Paul Horwich and Huw Price), that promises to solve the problems. According to this position, the problem of meaning can be solved by prohibiting an external perspective on meaning constituting properties. The idea (...) is that if we stick to a perspective on meaning that is internal to meaning discourse, then we can preserve the normativity of meaning and yet locate meaning in the natural world. I develop a generic motivation for this position, but argue that, since this motivation is consistent with the Ramsey–Carnap–Lewis–Jackson reductionist strategy, internalized meaning factualism is unstable. The problems about the normativity of meaning can therefore not be sidestepped in this way. (shrink)

In recruitment, promotion, admission, and other forms of wealth and power apportion, an evaluator typically ranks a set of candidates in terms of their competence. If the evaluator is prejudiced, the resulting ranking will misrepresent the candidates’ actual rankings. This constitutes not only a moral and a practical problem, but also an epistemological one, which begs the question of what we should do—epistemologically—to mitigate it. In a recent paper, Jönsson and Sjödahl in [Episteme 14:499–517, 2017], argue that the epistemic problem (...) can be fruitfully addressed by way of a novel statistical method that changes the products of biased behaviour, i.e. the rankings themselves, rather than the biased persons. Jönsson and Sjödahl’s pioneering proposal is a both a welcome addition to the literature on implicit bias, due the problems with existing implicit bias interventions [see e.g. Lai et al. in J Exp Psychol Gen 143:1765–1785; J Exp Psychol Gen 145:1001–1016, 2014; 2016; Forscher et al. in J Person Soc Psychol 117:522–559, 2019] but also to the literature on prejudice more generally, where many proposed prejudice-reduction strategies enjoy less than adequate empirical support [Paluck and Green in Ann Rev Psychol 60:339–367, 2009]. Their proposal, however, needs supplementation in two ways: the circumstances that must hold in order for it to work needs to be refined, and their claim that it works as intended in these circumstances needs to be validated. We argue that four of Jönsson and Sjödahl’s method’s presumed presuppositions can be weakened, but needs to be supplemented by two additional assumptions, overlooked by Jönsson and Sjödahl. Moreover, we demonstrate that the method does work as intended by way of a statistical simulation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.2 (2001) 307-308 [Access article in PDF] Mayer, Paola. Jena Romanticism and Its Appropriation of Jakob Böhme: Theosophy, Hagiography, Literature. McGill-Queen's Studies in the History of Ideas, no. 25. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999. Pp. x + 242. Cloth, $65.00. Paolo Mayer sets out to revise the accepted image of the influence of Jakob Böhme, the sixteenth-century mystic and (...) theosophist, on the romantic poets and philosophers who congregated at Jena in the years 1798-1803. She convincingly argues that, except for the philosophers and critics Friedrich Schlegel and F. W. J. Schelling, Böhme's direct influence was negligible, more a matter of the self-proclaimed new religion of romanticism making ideological use of a controversial, in some sense subversive, forerunner in German literary history. In the hands of Ludwig Tieck, for instance, or Novalis, Böhme becomes a symbol of the new religion of Poesie and the hostile reception afforded by the orthodox evangelical pastors of his time becomes an allegory for the hostility that the new, "let it all hang out" aesthetic of romanticism encountered in the more classical and form-loving members of the literary culture. In Mayer's terms, Böhme's reception among the poets was hagiographic; he was the romantics' poster child.Böhme lived from 1575 to 1624. The son of peasants, but by no means unlettered, the "mystic shoemaker of Görlitz" claimed the source of his teachings was direct divine revelation. He claimed to have visions in 1600 and 1610, whose content he translated into his unusually graphic writings, interspersed with Pietist attacks on reason and on outward religious observances. This unusual 'theology' blended themes that F. Schlegel and Schelling, at least, found attractive: (a) the idea of a self-generating or developmental God, (b) an approach to the problem of evil that logically seems to place responsibility on God, and (c) a large systematic role for desire and will, rather than reason, in the origin of the world and in human salvation. Notable also is the physicalism of Böhme's theology, and the assignment of a wrathful nature to God the Father. Böhme's reception in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, determined largely by a first biography written in 1652 by a disciple named von Furstenburg, was generally warm in pietist circles, cool in rationalist quarters, e.g., in that of Lessing and Leibniz.The established story is that all the major romantic writers, poets as well as philosophers, were influenced through a direct study of Böhme's texts. Mayer takes issue with that, especially in the case of the poets Tieck and Novalis and the scientists J. W. Ritter. Though each of them writes glowingly of Böhme as a poet—in fact a persecuted poet, a near-martyr for the religion of Poesie—Mayer finds no sound evidence for a direct transmission, either of ideas or of terminology, from Böhme to these figures. What other literary critics have advanced as evidence is, she argues, a body of ideas and vocabulary common to the Neoplatonic, mystic tradition and to Christian thinking in general. If a stricter standard of proving "reception" than mere similarity of language is adopted, it seems that Tieck, Novalis, and Ritter had a slim acquaintance with Böhme's writings, but nonetheless advanced a hagiographic view of the "folk poet." Others among the Jena circle—Schleiermacher, A. W. Schlegel, Dorothea and Caroline Schlegel—took a skeptical view of this propagandistic ploy. Only the more philosophical minds, F. Schlegel and Schelling, read Böhme in any depth or ventured elaborate appropriations. Mayer argues that both these figures went [End Page 307] through an initial phase of enthusiasm for Böhme, to be later followed by personal reservations about him and, eventually, by public criticism from a philosophical or orthodox theological stance. Mayer obviously relishes the irony, in this case, of an initial idolization of Böhme as a representative of the 'new religion... (shrink)

In het boek Exodus, hoofdstuk 3, wordt verteld hoe God aan Mozes verschijnt in een brandende braambos. De HEER heeft het lijden van Israel in Egypte gezien en wil hen daaruit bevrijden. Daartoe wordt Mozes naar de farao gestuurd om tegen hem te zeggen dat hij Israel moet laten gaan. Met die boodschap moet Mozes eerst naar Israel zelf. Vandaar zijn vraag: wat zullen zij zeggen? Zullen zij mij geloven, als ik zeg dat ik gestuurd ben door de God van (...) hun vader, van Abraham, Isaak en Jakob? Zullen zij niet vragen: wie is die God? Hoe is zijn naam? In antwoord daarop spreekt God de bekende woorden: ‘Ik ben die Ik ben.’ Mozes moet tot de Israelieten zeggen: ‘Ik ben heeft mij tot u gezonden.’ En verder: ‘De HEER, de God van uw vaderen, de God van Abraham, de God van Isaak en de God van Jakob, heeft mij tot u gezonden. Dit is mijn naam voor eeuwig en zo wil Ik aangeroepen worden van geslacht tot geslacht.’. (shrink)

Die zentrale Rolle des Gedächtnisses in der Entwicklung von Lebewesen wurde von Biologen wie Ernst Haeckel, Ewald Hering und Jakob von Uexküll erkannt, wobei zwischen einem Artgedächtnis und einem individuellen Gedächtnis unterschieden wird. Ersteres ist für die Aufrechterhaltung und Weiterentwicklung einer artspezifischen Erscheinungsform verantwortlich, letzteres gestaltet die Erinnerung an individuelle Erfahrungen. Im vorliegenden Band werden die Vorstellungen dieser Biologen mit Ideen der Philosophen G.W.F. Hegel, Alfred N. Whitehead, John Dewey, Ernst Cassirer, Henri Bergson und Reto L. Fetz in einer (...) kohärenten Theorie der Organismen, die auch den Menschen und seine Geschichte umfasst, aufeinander abgestimmt. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.4 (2001) 275-291 [Access article in PDF] The Conceptual Unity of Aristotle's Rhetoric 1 - [PDF] Alan G. Gross and Marcelo Dascal The standard view--that the Rhetoric lacks conceptual unity--has strong and prestigious support, stretching over most of the century. To David Ross in 1923 the unity of the Rhetoric was practical, not theoretical; to misunderstand this fact was to see this work, mistakenly, as "a (...) curious jumble of literary criticism with second-rate logic, ethics, and politics, and jurisprudence, mixed with the cunning of one who knows well how the weaknesses of the human heart are to be played upon" (285). So unaltered has been this view over the years that, in 1995, Jonathan Barnes could turn Ross's metaphor into an argument concerning the Rhetoric's lack of intellectual focus: it presents, not one art, but fragments of three arts, and of three arts that exist quite independently of rhetoric. The sections on logic have the closest connections with dialectic and in part overlap with what Aristotle says in the Topics; the sections on the emotions are linked to the ethical and psychological writings; Book III... shares its subject matter with the Poetics. Rhetoric... is a magpie, thieving a piece of one art and a piece of another, and then botching a nest of its own. (Companion 263-64) To Ross and Barnes, while logos, êthos, and pathos are essential to rhetorical invention, and style and arrangement are essential to rhetorical performance, they have nothing conceptually in common. Insofar as disciplinary identity depends on such conceptual unity, rhetorical studies lack such identity.William Grimaldi offers an alternate view; beneath Ross's jumble, he sees as the work's fundamental unifying principle, the enthymeme, which serves both as a form of argument and as a source for arguments about fact, character, and emotion. On this view, the factual content of a rhetorical argument is structured logically, a structure that is then molded linguistically [End Page 275] by means of êthos and pathos to suit the requirements of the particular case: "The content of... statements, the manner in which propositions will be expressed, the language, and images in casting the statements will be determined by the topical examination of the ethos and pathos of [a] particular speaker-auditor's situation" (Commentary I, 335n). Grimaldi convinced no one that this was the case; as Jakob Wisse has pointed out, Grimaldi's interpretation takes unacceptable hermeneutic liberties (27-28); nothing in the Rhetoric supports his view of the enthymeme as the central organizing principle of the work.Although we agree that Grimaldi was mistaken, we would like to argue that he was correct in seeing inferential processes as the key to the Rhetoric's conceptual unity. We would like to claim, however, that, contrary to Grimaldi's view, each of the three pisteis is inference-based, as is the canon of style. Moreover, the canon of arrangement, while not inference-based for Aristotle, plays a vital role in strengthening the patterns of inference that speakers prefer; in addition, it can be inference-based, as Perleman and Olbrechts-Tyteca have shown. So much conceptual unity seems to us consistent with Aristotle's definition of rhetoric; if such unity exists, it would mean that Aristotle was correct in calling rhetoric a tekhnê, which was, like dialectic or medicine, a unified body of knowledge (1.1.2-1354a1-14)We are not going to argue that the text as we have it is conceptually unified; obviously, no text that contains inconsistent views and serious ambiguities can be unified and there is little doubt that the Rhetoric contains such inconsistencies and ambiguities. With the aid of current scholarship, however, we intend to construct from the text a consistent theory of persuasion with inference as its base. In our construction, we will add nothing to Aristotle. But we will omit some passages--especially, a crucial one in which he seems clearly to spurn emotional and ethical means of persuasion (1.1.3-1354a16-45). We will also prefer some interpretations--especially an... (shrink)

Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843): A Philosophy of the Exact Sciences -/- Shortened version of the article of the same name in: Tabula Rasa. Jenenser magazine for critical thinking. 6th of November 1994 edition -/- 1. Biography -/- Jakob Friedrich Fries was born on the 23rd of August, 1773 in Barby on the Elbe. Because Fries' father had little time, on account of his journeying, he gave up both his sons, of whom Jakob Friedrich was the elder, to (...) the Herrnhut Teaching Institution in Niesky in 1778. Fries attended the theological seminar in Niesky in autumn 1792, which lasted for three years. There he (secretly) began to study Kant. The reading of Kant's works led Fries, for the first time, to a deep philosophical satisfaction. His enthusiasm for Kant is to be understood against the background that a considerable measure of Kant's philosophy is based on a firm foundation of what happens in an analogous and similar manner in mathematics. -/- During this period he also read Heinrich Jacobi's novels, as well as works of the awakening classic German literature; in particular Friedrich Schiller's works. In 1795, Fries arrived at Leipzig University to study law. During his time in Leipzig he became acquainted with Fichte's philosophy. In autumn of the same year he moved to Jena to hear Fichte at first hand, but was soon disappointed. -/- During his first sojourn in Jenaer (1796), Fries got to know the chemist A. N. Scherer who was very influenced by the work of the chemist A. L. Lavoisier. Fries discovered, at Scherer's suggestion, the law of stoichiometric composition. Because he felt that his work still need some time before completion, he withdrew as a private tutor to Zofingen (in Switzerland). There Fries worked on his main critical work, and studied Newton's "Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica". He remained a lifelong admirer of Newton, whom he praised as a perfectionist of astronomy. Fries saw the final aim of his mathematical natural philosophy in the union of Newton's Principia with Kant's philosophy. -/- With the aim of qualifying as a lecturer, he returned to Jena in 1800. Now Fries was known from his independent writings, such as "Reinhold, Fichte and Schelling" (1st edition in 1803), and "Systems of Philosophy as an Evident Science" (1804). The relationship between G. W. F. Hegel and Fries did not develop favourably. Hegel speaks of "the leader of the superficial army", and at other places he expresses: "he is an extremely narrow-minded bragger". On the other hand, Fries also has an unfavourable take on Hegel. He writes of the "Redundancy of the Hegelistic dialectic" (1828). In his History of Philosophy (1837/40) he writes of Hegel, amongst other things: "Your way of philosophising seems just to give expression to nonsense in the shortest possible way". In this work, Fries appears to argue with Hegel in an objective manner, and expresses a positive attitude to his work. -/- In 1805, Fries was appointed professor for philosophy in Heidelberg. In his time spent in Heidelberg, he married Caroline Erdmann. He also sealed his friendships with W. M. L. de Wette and F. H. Jacobi. Jacobi was amongst the contemporaries who most impressed Fries during this period. In Heidelberg, Fries wrote, amongst other things, his three-volume main work New Critique of Reason (1807). -/- In 1816 Fries returned to Jena. When in 1817 the Wartburg festival took place, Fries was among the guests, and made a small speech. 1819 was the so-called "Great Year" for Fries: His wife Caroline died, and Karl Sand, a member of a student fraternity, and one of Fries' former students stabbed the author August von Kotzebue to death. Fries was punished with a philosophy teaching ban but still received a professorship for physics and mathematics. Only after a period of years, and under restrictions, he was again allowed to read philosophy. From now on, Fries was excluded from political influence. The rest of his life he devoted himself once again to philosophical and natural studies. During this period, he wrote "Mathematical Natural Philosophy" (1822) and the "History of Philosophy" (1837/40). -/- Fries suffered from a stroke on New Year's Day 1843, and a second stroke, on the 10th of August 1843 ended his life. -/- 2. Fries' Work Fries left an extensive body of work. A look at the subject areas he worked on makes us aware of the universality of his thinking. Amongst these subjects are: Psychic anthropology, psychology, pure philosophy, logic, metaphysics, ethics, politics, religious philosophy, aesthetics, natural philosophy, mathematics, physics and medical subjects, to which, e.g., the text "Regarding the optical centre in the eye together with general remarks about the theory of seeing" (1839) bear witness. With popular philosophical writings like the novel "Julius and Evagoras" (1822), or the arabesque "Longing, and a Trip to the Middle of Nowhere" (1820), he tried to make his philosophy accessible to a broader public. Anthropological considerations are shown in the methodical basis of his philosophy, and to this end, he provides the following didactic instruction for the study of his work: "If somebody wishes to study philosophy on the basis of this guide, I would recommend that after studying natural philosophy, a strict study of logic should follow in order to peruse metaphysics and its applied teachings more rapidly, followed by a strict study of criticism, followed once again by a return to an even closer study of metaphysics and its applied teachings." -/- 3. Continuation of Fries' work through the Friesian School -/- Fries' ideas found general acceptance amongst scientists and mathematicians. A large part of the followers of the "Fries School of Thought" had a scientific or mathematical background. Amongst them were biologist Matthias Jakob Schleiden, mathematics and science specialist philosopher Ernst Friedrich Apelt, the zoologist Oscar Schmidt, and the mathematician Oscar Xavier Schlömilch. Between the years 1847 and 1849, the treatises of the "Fries School of Thought", with which the publishers aimed to pursue philosophy according to the model of the natural sciences appeared. In the Kant-Fries philosophy, they saw the realisation of this ideal. The history of the "New Fries School of Thought" began in 1903. It was in this year that the philosopher Leonard Nelson gathered together a small discussion circle in Goettingen. Amongst the founding members of this circle were: A. Rüstow, C. Brinkmann and H. Goesch. In 1904 L. Nelson, A. Rüstow, H. Goesch and the student W. Mecklenburg travelled to Thuringia to find the missing Fries writings. In the same year, G. Hessenberg, K. Kaiser and Nelson published the first pamphlet from their first volume of the "Treatises of the Fries School of Thought, New Edition". -/- The school set out with the aim of searching for the missing Fries' texts, and re-publishing them with a view to re-opening discussion of Fries' brand of philosophy. The members of the circle met regularly for discussions. Additionally, larger conferences took place, mostly during the holidays. Featuring as speakers were: Otto Apelt, Otto Berg, Paul Bernays, G. Fraenkel, K. Grelling, G. Hessenberg, A. Kronfeld, O. Meyerhof, L. Nelson and R. Otto. On the 1st of March 1913, the Jakob-Friedrich-Fries society was founded. Whilst the Fries' school of thought dealt in continuum with the advancement of the Kant-Fries philosophy, the members of the Jakob-Friedrich-Fries society's main task was the dissemination of the Fries' school publications. In May/June, 1914, the organisations took part in their last common conference before the gulf created by the outbreak of the First World War. Several members died during the war. Others returned disabled. The next conference took place in 1919. A second conference followed in 1921. Nevertheless, such intensive work as had been undertaken between 1903 and 1914 was no longer possible. -/- Leonard Nelson died in October 1927. In the 1930's, the 6th and final volume of "Treatises of the Fries School of Thought, New Edition" was published. Franz Oppenheimer, Otto Meyerhof, Minna Specht and Grete Hermann were involved in their publication. -/- 4. About Mathematical Natural Philosophy -/- In 1822, Fries' "Mathematical Natural Philosophy" appeared. Fries rejects the speculative natural philosophy of his time - above all Schelling's natural philosophy. A natural study, founded on speculative philosophy, ceases with its collection, arrangement and order of well-known facts. Only a mathematical natural philosophy can deliver the necessary explanatory reasoning. The basic dictum of his mathematical natural philosophy is: "All natural theories must be definable using purely mathematically determinable reasons of explanation." Fries is of the opinion that science can attain completeness only by the subordination of the empirical facts to the metaphysical categories and mathematical laws. -/- The crux of Fries' natural philosophy is the thought that mathematics must be made fertile for use by the natural sciences. However, pure mathematics displays solely empty abstraction. To be able to apply them to the sensory world, an intermediatory connection is required. Mathematics must be connected to metaphysics. The pure mechanics, consisting of three parts are these: a) A study of geometrical movement, which considers solely the direction of the movement, b) A study of kinematics, which considers velocity in Addition, c) A study of dynamic movement, which also incorporates mass and power, as well as direction and velocity. -/- Of great interest is Fries' natural philosophy in view of its methodology, particularly with regard to the doctrine "leading maxims". Fries calls these "leading maxims" "heuristic", "because they are principal rules for scientific invention". -/- Fries' philosophy found great recognition with Carl Friedrich Gauss, amongst others. Fries asked for Gauss's opinion on his work "An Attempt at a Criticism based on the Principles of the Probability Calculus" (1842). Gauss also provided his opinions on "Mathematical Natural Philosophy" (1822) and on Fries' "History of Philosophy". Gauss acknowledged Fries' philosophy and wrote in a letter to Fries: "I have always had a great predilection for philosophical speculation, and now I am all the more happy to have a reliable teacher in you in the study of the destinies of science, from the most ancient up to the latest times, as I have not always found the desired satisfaction in my own reading of the writings of some of the philosophers. In particular, the writings of several famous (maybe better, so-called famous) philosophers who have appeared since Kant have reminded me of the sieve of a goat-milker, or to use a modern image instead of an old-fashioned one, of Münchhausen's plait, with which he pulled himself from out of the water. These amateurs would not dare make such a confession before their Masters; it would not happen were they were to consider the case upon its merits. I have often regretted not living in your locality, so as to be able to glean much pleasurable entertainment from philosophical verbal discourse." -/- The starting point of the new adoption of Fries was Nelson's article "The critical method and the relation of psychology to philosophy" (1904). Nelson dedicates special attention to Fries' re-interpretation of Kant's deduction concept. Fries awards Kant's criticism the rationale of anthropological idiom, in that he is guided by the idea that one can examine in a psychological way which knowledge we have "a priori", and how this is created, so that we can therefore recognise our own knowledge "a priori" in an empirical way. Fries understands deduction to mean an "awareness residing darkly in us is, and only open to basic metaphysical principles through conscious reflection.". -/- Nelson has pointed to an analogy between Fries' deduction and modern metamathematics. In the same manner, as with the anthropological deduction of the content of the critical investigation into the metaphysical object show, the content of mathematics become, in David Hilbert's view, the object of metamathematics. -/-. (shrink)

Jakob Friedrich Fries is one of the most important representatives of the Critical Philosophy, someone who built immediately on the original Kantian philosophy. -/- Fries was born in 1773 in Barby (on the Elbe). In 1805 he was extraordinary professor for philosophy in Jena and in the same year was ordinary professor for philosophy in Heidelberg. Returning to Jena in 1816, one year later he was compulsorily retired because of his participation at the nationalistic and republican Wartburg Festival. In (...) 1924 he obtained a professorship for physics and mathematics, and in 1838 he was given back a professorship for philosophy. He died in 1843 in Jena. -/- The book summarizes the research results of the DFG-Project "Jakob Friedrich Fries' Influence on the Sciences of the 19th Century". The research project was carried out by Dr. Kay Herrmann (Institute of Philosophy, Jena University) and Prof. Dr. Wolfram Hogrebe (Institute of Philosophy, Bonn University). Such a study has special importance. There is available a large amount of literature about the "speculative contemporaries" of Fries, like Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. In contrast to the "speculative philosophy", there has been published only a few studies about the Friesian natural philosophy. Fries was, in his natural-philosophical studies, looking for a link between philosophy and modern sciences, wheras his "speculative philosophical" contemporaries felt obligated to stick primarily to a descriptive, phenomenal view of nature. So far the question "How was mathematical natural philosophy regarded by scientists and mathematicians of the 19th century?" has hardly been investigated. Archival studies showed that this gap in Fries-research can be filled. The Friesian correspondence turned out to be a rich gold mine. -/- The present publication is more than a research report. The monographic first part is intended to introduce the foundations of the Friesian theory of cognition, the Friesian methodology, and the Friesian natural philosophy. This should facilitate entry into Friesian philosophy. -/- The Friesian theory is analyzed from two points of view: •How did Fries suceed in continuing and improving the Kantian approach? Is Fries able to remove the weak points of Kantian philosophy? -/- •What is the current significance of the Friesian approach? There are some interesting similarities between the Friesian approach and modern philosophical theories (such like Chomsky's theory of "universal grammer"). The lasting core of the Friesian theory of cognition is: To use empirical studies for working on philosophical problems. -/- Chapters 3 and 4 are scientific-historically oriented. These chapters analyze the Friesian position in scientific and mathematical debates (debates about the a priori foundations of physics, the problem of the identification of physics as an independent discipline, the problem of the boundary between chemistry and physics, the problem of mathematization of the sciences, the theory of the imponderabilia, the systematics and structure of sciences and mathematics, problems of infinity, the differential calculus, the theory of parallel lines) and the relation between Fries and the scientists of the 19th century. The book contains the latest findings gained by evaluation of the Friesian unpublished work (for example the correspondence with W. Weber, C. F. Gauß, E. F. Apelt, O. Schlömilch, Ch. Reichel, B. A. v. Lindenau, L. Gmelin, E. G. Fischer, A. N. Scherer, J. S. C. Schweigger) -/- One result of the research project is that some important scientists took a favourable view of the Friesian theory, but the influence of the Friesian philosophy on the sciences of the 19th century was very limited. The causes are very complex: An anti-natural-philosophical spirit of age, the limits of the Kantian inspired philosophy and some unfavourable aspects in the biography of Fries. -/- For the first time the voluminous Fries-Reichel-correspondence was evaluated. The Fries-Reichel-correspondence contains the Friesian approach to prove the 11th Euclidean axiom, and the whole transcript of the Friesian attempt at proof is given. // Der erste Teil des Buches will in die Grundprobleme Fries’scher Erkenntnis­theorie, Methodenlehre und Naturphilosophie einführen, wobei das Hauptaugenmerk auf die Fortführung der kantischen Ansätze durch Fries sowie auf die aktuelle Interpretation der Fries’schen Lehre gerichtet ist. Der wissenschaftshistorisch ausgerichtete zweite Teil analysiert Fries’ Stellung zu naturwissenschaftlichen und mathematischen Diskussionsrichtungen (Probleme der Identifizierung der Physik als eigenständige Disziplin, der Grenzziehung zwischen Physik und Chemie, der Mathematisierung der Naturwissenschaften, der Imponderabilientheorie, der Systematik von Naturwissenschaft und Mathematik, des Unendlichen, der Parallelentheorie usw.) sowie sein Verhältnis zu Naturwissenschaftlern und Mathematikern seiner Zeit. Das Buch enthält neue Erkenntnisse, die aus der Auswertung zahlreicher Nachlassmaterialien gewonnen wurden. Erstmalig wird unter dem Blickwinkel „Fries als Naturwissenschaftler und Mathematiker“ auch der sehr umfangreiche Reichel-Briefwechsel ausgewertet. Dem Reichel-Briefwechsel entstammt auch Fries’ Versuch eines Beweises des Parallelenaxioms, der in diesem Buch erstmalig in transkribierter Form vollständig vorliegt. -/- . (shrink)

Band 10 der Gesammelten Schriften Sulzers enthalt den gesamten Briefwechsel zwischen J. G. Sulzer (1720-1779) und J. J. Bodmer (1698-1783), der hier zum ersten Mal vollstandig nach den Handschriften transkribiert und kommentiert wird. Fur die Edition von Sulzers Schriften ist dieser Briefwechsel geradezu fundamental: Mit seinen 453 Briefen, die in 35 Jahren (1744-1779) entstanden sind, zahlt er zu den umfangreichsten Korrespondenzen Sulzers und liefert zahlreiche neue Informationen zu zentralen Themenfeldern der europaischen Aufklarung, zur Genese von Sulzers und Bodmers Schriften, zu (...) ihrem Netzwerk, insbesondere in Preuaen und in der Schweiz, sowie zu Aspekten ihres Privatlebens. Damit erweist sich dieser Briefwechsel als eine unumgangliche Quelle, will man die Formierung des literarischen und akademischen Feldes in der Aufklarungsepoche untersuchen. (shrink)

This article analyses the 1936 “Wotan” essay by Swiss psychologist Carl Gustav Jung in light of one of its reigning motifs, Ergriffenheit. First, this term is examined within the works of Protestant theologian Rudolf Otto and Indologist Jakob Wilhelm Hauer, who used it to describe what they claimed to be the original religious experience, a state of being deeply stirred or even seized by the “the holy” or by “the ultimate reality.” The article then examines antecedents in Jung's theory (...) of states of psychic seizure, in which two halves of the psyche come into conflict, the resolution of which leads to an increased capacity to create the arts of culture. The analysis then moves to the “Wotan” essay itself, where Jung brings together his own theory of psychic seizure with the theory of the original religious experience as proposed by the above-named scholars of religion in order to suggest that, under National Socialism, the Germans were in the midst of a collective confrontation with their own inner divinity, which should lead to a national spiritual rebirth. The article then investigates the works of several of the men Jung mentions in the essay, as well as his use of ancient Germanic mythology, to support his claim. Through his portrait of the Germanic archetype Wotan, Jung psychologizes and thereby essentializes the Romantic image of the Germans as “a people of poets and philosophers” as well as that of a Nietzschean “master-race.” In conclusion, the article argues that, at least in 1936, Jung's attitude towards Hitler and National Socialism was much more favorable than has previously been recognized. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 143 sensual reason is supposed to develop the powers of observation and reasoning to the highest degree but not the spiritual intuition into the essence of things. Steiner proposed a theory of reincarnation; he also created a special kind of Christology which is based on the assumption that there were two Jesus-boys, one of whom incarnated the spirit of Zarathustra. As for Christ he descended into the (...) second Jesus from extraterrestrial spheres where he pre-existed. This is the "mystery of Golgatha," a decisive event in the history of mankind. Steiner has also a special concept of Karma as world spirit. His beliefs are strongly influenced by the German "Naturphilosophie" of the Romantic epoch and by Fichte whom he admires. The main theme of his life-work is the struggle against "materialism," against the concept of "homo oeconomieus," although Steiner was connected in the beginning with the leaders of the Austrian social democracy, such as his friends, Engelbert Pernerstorfer, and Viktor Adler. There is also the influence of German mystics, such as Jakob Boehme, on his thinking. This collection of lectures shows also that in the crucial period of German nationalism-during World War I--Steiner was not a chauvinist. He criticized, for instance, in these lectures the chauvinistic aberrations of Thomas Mann. He predicts (p. 100), in the course of the mechanization of human thinking, the construction of machines which would replace thinking itself. Instead of thinking, there would be mere "switching" (man schiebt). He predicts furthermore (p. 98) that this radical mechanization of man will come from America. The greater part of mankind will be influenced by America from the West.... It will not take too much time: around the year 2000 there will be issued in America not a formal but still a sort of prohibition of thinking; there will be a law that will have the purpose of repressing all individual thinking. On one side there is already the beginning of this development in purely materialistic medicine where the soul is not permitted to act but man is dealt with on the basis of external experiments as a pure machine. MAx RINSER New York City The Later Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood. By Alan Donagan. (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press~ 1962. Pp. xi + 332. $6.00.) The influence of Collingwood has been evident in many disciplines, and, judging from the number of books, articles, and dissertations being prepared with him and his interests in mind, it is a safe guess that he will remain an ubiquitous influence for some time. Yet because Collingwood 's interests were so wide and his attraction so general, few, if any, of his readers and critics have attempted to "place" him. This is not to say that the critical works prepared by T. M. Knox (the "Editor's Preface" to The Idea of History, 1946) and E. W. F. Tomlin (R. G. Collingwood, 195~) were unconcerned with such an issue. Indeed, their respective studies appear to have it in mind; nevertheless, it was not the impetus for the specific work, and as a result their researches tend to be prolegomena. With the publication of Donagan's book, however, there is presented a study which must be considered a landmark, if not a turning point, in the tradition of Collingwood criticism: for Donagan not only "places" Collingwood, he also attempts to justify his conclusion. And for the critic it is the subtlety of Donagan's arguments, ~lbeit their venturesome quality, which leads one to suggest that this book will make its "contributions " both to the tradition in particular and to the avid interest in general. In the Preface, Donagan acknowledges the fact that in order to "place" Collingwood his readers must be persuaded "to abandon the injurious preconception with which Collingwood's later books are often read" (p. vii). Although he does not designate what these "preconceptions " are, it may be surmised that they have something to do with the traditional tendency among the critics to read too lightly The New Leviathan (1942). Donagan believes that Colling~ wood's "later" masterpieces, "The Idea of History (1936-39?), The Principles of Art (1938), and the first three parts of The... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:PRZYWARA AND VON BALTHASAR ON ANALOGY ERICK PRZYWARA'S major work is entitled Analogia Entis: Metaphysil:,, Ur-Struktur und All-Rhythmus.1 As we will explain, it is especially the subtitle, " Basicstructure and Overall-rhythm", which is important in understanding the type of metaphysics he proposes. An explicit treatment of analogy by Hans Urs von Balthasar may be found in a se:des of two articles, " Analogie und Dialektik " and " Analogie (...) und Natur ", both of which carry the subtitle, " A clarification of the theological principles of Karl Barth " (1944-1945).2 They later become the basis of two important sections of Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung Seiner Theologie.3 The first becomes part of Balthasar's demonstration on Barth's "turn to analogy ".4 The second becomes part of presentation of Catholic" thought-form": "The concept of nature in Catholic theology". This context, the dialogue with Barth and Catholic theology in relationship to Barth, is essential for understanding Balthas,ar's views on analogy-as well as his relationship to Erich Przywara, anotheT dialogue partner of Barth. The "one concrete order of salvation", as 1 Anafogia En-tis. (AE) Einsiedeln: Johannes-Verlag, 1962. Second edition. The first edition (Munich: Koesel & Pustet, 1932), however, lacks this subtitle. It is called: Analogia Entis. JJfetaphysik. I. Prinzip. The new subtitle is a response to a "misunderstanding" (e.g., Barth's accusation) that analogia entis was only a metaphysical principle. Przywara also clarifies the sense in which analogy can be called a "principle" in the new forward to the second edition (p. 5), as well as in a new ending on p. 210. 2Both in Divus Thomas: the first in #22 (1944), 171-216; the second in # 23 (1945)' 3-56. 3 Cologne: Jakob Hegner Verlag, 1951. 4Cf. "Die Wendung zur.Analogie", 93-123; as well as "Die Vollgestalt der Analogie", 124-180. Balthasar acknowledges his indebtedness to Przywara in the enlarged treatment of analogy in Barth: cf. p. 10 ancl p. 404 n.3 (for the section on the" concept of nature in Catholic theology.") 473 474 JAMES V. ZEITZ, S.J. the place where analogy thinking must begin and end, is typical of both Przywarn and Balthasar-and reflects undoubtedly the influence of Barth on bot1h of these Catholic and (at the time) Jesuit theologians. To start at an earlier stage, however, the real issue of analogy, in both Przywa;ra and Balthasar's writings is the God question. How can we maintain God's transcendence as a true ' other ' in relation to immanence-the one concrete order where Jesus Christ is already present? This is first of all a prroblem for any theological method. The starting point and language which proceeds from this starting point must allow for transcendence within immanence. Thus Balthasar's aibove-mentioned work on analogy discusses the problem using the rubric of the time, a " concept of nacbure " in relationship to Ubernatur. His question is: what concept of nature is able bo relate to Ubernatur, while remaining truly a creaturely concept of nature? His thesis is that nature cannot be abstract or "pure " in an 18th century, secularized philosophical sense (e.g. Baius), but-in conformity with the whole tradition of the Ohurch Fathers, where nature means the whole human condition-the concept of nature is always already analogous, since ' rnan ' as creature can never stand aside from his already given, concrete nature within the order of salvation.5 Przywara had already prepared the way for this by insisting on a creaturely metaphysics leading to a theological metaphysics, where analogy is the adequate method. Besides the theological method, however, there is the problem of transcendence within one's understanding of Christ and the biblical revelation of the New Testament. Is there really a place for what can only be revealed and received? Or, to state the question in Balthasar's terms: how is the "one, concrete order", where Jesus Christ is already pa,rt of our history, 5 Cf. "Der Begriff der Natur in der Theologie ". Eine Diskussion zwischen Hans Urs von Balthasar und Engelbert Gutwenger. ZKTh vol. 75, 1953. 452461. In this debate, Balthasar further clarifies what he had said in Durstellung, in response to Gutwenger... (shrink)

Selected writings, including those of Gʹyu-thog Yon-tan-mgon-po, 1126 to 1202, on the morality of Tibetan medicine.

Vague language refers to expressions with unspecified meaning (for instance, 'I kind of want that job'), and is an important but often overlooked part of linguistic communication. This book is a comparative study of vague language based on naturally occurring data of a rare combination: L1 (American) and L2 (Chinese and Persian) speakers in academic settings. The findings indicate that L2 learners have diverse and culturally specific needs for vague language, and generally use vague words in a more concentrated fashion (...) compared with L1s. The book explores the interconnection and continuum between the linguistic realizations of a vague term and the functions it serves, and how 'elasticity' underpins the frequency and functions of vague language. The implication is that vague language may be integrated into the curriculum of English language teaching as part of L2 speakers' communicative competence. This book will be of great interest to researchers in the fields of intercultural education and applied linguistics. (shrink)

Background Scientific and technological advancements in mapping and understanding the interrelated pathways through which biological and environmental exposures affect disease development create new possibilities for detecting disease risk factors. Early detection of such risk factors may help prevent disease onset or moderate the disease course, thereby decreasing associated disease burden, morbidity, and mortality. However, the ethical implications of screening for disease risk factors are unclear and the current literature provides a fragmented and case-by-case picture. Methods To identify key ethical considerations (...) arising from the early detection of disease risk factors, we performed a systematic scoping review. The Scopus, Embase, and Philosopher’s Index databases were searched for peer-reviewed, academic records, which were included if they were written in English or Dutch and concerned the ethics of (1) early detection of (2) disease risk factors for (3) disease caused by environmental factors or gene-environment interactions. All records were reviewed independently by at least two researchers. Results After screening 2034 titles and abstracts, and 112 full papers, 55 articles were included in the thematic synthesis of the results. We identified eight common ethical themes: (1) Reliability and uncertainty in early detection, (2) autonomy, (3) privacy, (4) beneficence and non-maleficence, (5) downstream burdens on others, (6) responsibility, (7) justice, and (8) medicalization and conceptual disruption. We identified several gaps in the literature, including a relative scarcity of research on ethical considerations associated with environmental preventive health interventions, a dearth of practical suggestions on how to address expressed concerns about overestimating health capacities, and a lack of insights into preventing undue attribution of health responsibility to individuals. Conclusions The ethical concerns arising with the early detection of risk factors are often interrelated and complex. Comprehensive ethical analyses are needed that are better embedded in normative frameworks and also assess and weigh the expected benefits of early risk factor detection. Such research is necessary for developing and implementing responsible and fair preventive health policies. (shrink)